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ESSAY

Maritime Emissions Taxation:
An Alternative to the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme?
JON M. TRUBY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The advent of the eighteenth session of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Conference of the Parties (COP18)1 internationalized a new sense
of urgency2 towards preventing the planet from spiraling towards
an unsustainable rise in global temperatures, with an emphasis
that states must simply do more than fulfill their existing
obligations.3 Prior to the summit, the European Union (EU)
raised the issue of maritime greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,

*Dr. Jon Truby, Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor of Environmental Law &
Policy at the College of Law, Qatar University.
1. What is COP?, COP18, http://www.cop18.qa/en-us/aboutcop18cmp8/
cop18cmp8.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). The 18th session of the Conference
of the Parties to the UNFCCC and the 8th session of the Meeting of the Parties
to the Kyoto Protocol, to review the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and
take decisions to promote its effective implementation, took place from Nov. 26,
2012 to Dec. 7, 2012 in Doha, Qatar.
2. See generally THE WORLD BANK, TURN DOWN THE HEAT: WHY A 4°C
WARMER WORLD MUST BE AVOIDED (2012), available at http://
climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4
_degree_centrigrade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf (warning that the
world must take greater measures than currently agreed, in order to avoid a 4°C
rise in global temperatures).
3. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Climate Action: Questions and Answers on
the UN Climate Conference in Doha No. 12/888 (Nov. 23 2012), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-888_en.htm
(stressing
the
importance of entering new binding commitments to reduce GHGs).
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where an absence of any binding international agreement meant
that the shipping industry was not privy to the same emissions
reduction imperatives4 as other sectors.5
Having previously bound itself to reducing emissions,6 the
EU proposed including GHG emissions from the maritime
transportation sector in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU
ETS),7 but also raised alternative options for internal measures
including the imposition of an emissions tax.8 Such action from
the EU could have far-reaching implications for the rest of the
world,9 potentially instigating other states to take any number of
possible actions.10 These actions may include objecting to such a

4. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) considered the maritime
transport sector to be ‘undercharged’ (in terms of their fuel). INT’L MONETARY
FUND, MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL AVIATION AND SHIPPING
AS A SOURCE OF CLIMATE FINANCE 5 (2011), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/g20/pdf/110411a.pdf.
5. See Press Release, Council of the EU, Conclusions on the Preparations for
the 18th Session of COP 18 to the UNFCCC and the 8th Session of the Meeting
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Doha, Qatar, Nov. 26 - Dec. 7, 2012) 3194th
Environment Council Meeting, Luxembourg 6 (Oct. 25, 2012), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/13322
7.pdf.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 14-22.
7. Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 April 2009 Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the
Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of the Community, 2009
O.J. (L 140) 63, 63 [hereinafter Directive 2009/29/EC], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:en:pdf.
8. EUR. COMM’N, ROADMAP: MEASURES TO INCLUDE MARITIME TRANSPORT
EMISSIONS IN THE EU'S GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION COMMITMENT IF NO
INTERNATIONAL RULES AGREED 2 (2011) [hereinafter ROADMAP], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2012_clima_001_
maritime_transport_emissions_en.pdf.
9. Benefits of Trade Liberalisation: Trade Costs, OECD, http://
www.oecd.org/tad/benefitlib/trade-costs.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (noting
that as of 2007, 90% of global trade by volume is carried by ship); JASPER FABER
ET AL., TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN ACTION TO REDUCING GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRANSPORT 11 (2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/shipping/docs/ghg_ships_
report_en.pdf (noting approximately one third of world shipping emissions
stemmed from voyages arriving at or departing from EU ports).
10. M.E. DAVIES ET AL., BMT MURRAY FENTON EDON LIDDIARD VINCE LTD.,
STUDY ON THE ECONOMIC, LEGAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF A EUROPEAN UNION SYSTEM TO REDUCE SHIP EMISSIONS OF SO2 AND NOX: FINAL
REPORT FOR EUROPEAN COMMISSION CONTRACT 25 (2000), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/taxation/ship_emissions/pdf/
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scheme, seeking instead to capitalize by attracting new shipping
registrations through carbon leakage;11 seeking an international
agreement to avoid unilateral action by one legislature; or taking
similar measures themselves rather than risk losing important
revenues.12
Focusing on the EU’s alternative proposal of an emissions
tax, this article analyzes the possibility for the imposition by an
EU Member State of a targeted environmental tax to reduce
maritime emissions. It considers how such a tax can be imposed
in a manner that will not be detrimental to commercial interests
and can instigate the desired impact.13 Importantly, it focuses
upon providing a greater incentive for the maritime industry to
invest in the most efficient shipping fleet to reduce emissions. It
concludes by comparing whether such a perceived maritime
emissions tax could be more advantageous than including
maritime emissions in the EU ETS.

mainfinal.pdf (noting approximately half of the world’s ships gross registered at
250 tons or more are estimated to operate in European waters).
11. The European Commission defines carbon leakage as the term often
used to describe the situation that may occur if, for reasons of costs
related to climate policies, businesses were to transfer production to
other countries which have laxer constraints on greenhouse gas
emissions. This could lead to an increase in their total emissions.
The risk of carbon leakage may be higher in certain energy-intensive
industries.
Climate Action, Carbon Leakage, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/ets/cap/leakage/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). See also
Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon
Leakage, 65 J. INT’L ECON. 421, 422 (2005) (explaining how some developing
countries may be willing to relax carbon emissions rules to attract relocating
companies).
12. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 4, at 38 (calculating revenues from
international maritime fuels).
13. Directive 2009/29/EC, supra note 7, at 63 (This is also in line with the
stated intention of the EU in selecting from the various legal instruments
available, with its Directive stating that any “proposal should [minimize] any
negative impact on the Community’s competitiveness while taking into account
the potential environmental benefits.”).
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II. BACKGROUND: EU LAW
The EU’s 20-20-20 policy, for decreasing emissions across the
Union from 1990 levels by at least 20% by 2020,14 imposed a
deadline of December 31, 2011 to reach an international
agreement through the UNFCCC15 or through the International
Maritime Organization (IMO),16 incorporating maritime
emissions reductions targets. While the EU envisioned progress
at COP18 towards an international agreement,17 it was conscious
that neither the Kyoto Protocol18 nor the Copenhagen Accord had
enabled a binding commitment to reduce maritime emissions.19
Since the deadline passed without the required international
agreement, the European Commission (EC) was compelled to
propose a new Community law requiring maritime emissions
reductions targets, with an aim of it coming into force by 2013.20
14. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions: 20 20 by 2020: Europe's Climate Change Opportunity, at 2, COM (2008)
30 final (Jan. 23, 2008).
15. See Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate
Change, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited Oct. 17,
2013) (noting “the question of what happens beyond 2020 was answered by
Parties in Durban (2011)”).
16. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from
Maritime Transport and Amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013, at 10, COM
(2013) 480 final (June 28, 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/
impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2013/com_2013_0480_en.pdf.
17. See Doha Conference Must Lay the Foundations for the 2015 Global
Climate Deal, EUR. COMM’N (Nov. 23, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/
articles/news_2012112301_en.htm.
18. A binding treaty with obligations for states to stabilize their GHG
emissions. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22,
available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html (Article 2.2 simply calls upon
Annex 1 parties to work through the IMO to “pursue limitation or reduction of
emissions of greenhouse gases . . . from . . . marine bunker fuels. . . .”).
19. See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Conference of the Parties, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19, 2009, Decisions
Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30,
2010), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/ eng/11a01.pdf (No
mention of maritime emissions was made in the Copenhagen Accord.).
20. Directive 2009/29/EC, supra note 7 at 63. See also Decision 406/2009/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Effort of
Member States to Reduce Their Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Meet the
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One of the four legal instruments proposed as options to achieve
this goal was a maritime emissions tax21 with hypothecated
revenues.22 Before considering how such a tax could effectively
be designed, it is first necessary to summarize why change is
required.
III. NEED FOR CHANGE
Aside from fuel costs, the status quo provides little incentive
for the maritime industry to shift to a lower emissions model of
transportation.23 Continued failure to account for the negative
externalities24 caused by this sector may fulfill predictions that
maritime transport emissions will rise further.25 The EU’s
dictum of requiring the polluter to take financial responsibility
Community’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Commitments Up to 2020,
2009 O.J. (L 140) 136, 136, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0136:0148:en:pdf.
21. See Public Consultation, Eur. Comm’n, Including Maritime Transport
Emissions in the EU's Greenhouse Gas Reduction Commitment,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/articles/0014_en.htm (last updated Mar.
10, 2013) (noticing of the EC public consultation on the issue to be held until
April 2012).
22. See ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT COMMITTEE, THE 2007 PRE-BUDGET REPORT
AND COMPREHENSIVE SPENDING REVIEW: AN ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS, 2007-8,
H.C. 149-I, at 8-9 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmenvaud/149/149.pdf (noting that earmarking tax
revenues for clear environmental purposes helps reach environmental objectives
while increasing taxpayer support for the charge). See also ROADMAP, supra
note 8, at 2.
23. See Commission Staff Working Paper Annex to: The Communication on
Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution and The Directive on “Ambient Air Quality
and Cleaner Air for Europe” Impact Assessment, at 30, COM (2005) 446 final
(Sept. 21, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/
cafe/pdf/ia_report_en050921_final.pdf (estimating that maritime emissions of
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide may be as polluting as the combined
impact of the same land-based pollutants by 2020 if no actions are taken). See
also Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment Accompanying the
Document: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council Amending Directive 1999/32/EC as Regards the Sulphur Content of
Marine Fuels, at 6, COM (2011) 439 final (July 15, 2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/transport/pdf/ships/sec_2011_918_en.pdf.
24. See generally A. C. PIGUO, WEALTH AND WELFARE (1912) (arguing for a
corrective use of taxation so as to internalize negative externalities); but see
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 33-40 (1960)
(questioning the use of taxation to internalize externalities); STEVEN N. S.
CHEUNG, THE MYTH OF SOCIAL COST (3d ed. 1992).
25. FABER ET AL., supra note 9, at 11.
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for its pollution26 can reduce emissions by discouraging27 harmful
business-as-usual practices28 and instigating a shift towards a
more environmentally efficient method of transport.29 Without it,
society is left with the cost for an environmental negativity that,
without action, will contribute to the world’s progression towards
a 4°C average rise in temperatures.30
Nevertheless, this article seeks a solution which does not
hinder the competitiveness of the maritime sector, but which
promotes its development in a sustainable fashion. With the
shipping industry struggling financially31 and host countries
unwilling to lose the business of registered vessels which may be
re-registered in a state with lighter regulations,32 there are stark
dangers of introducing a measure without clear objectives.
IV. SOLUTIONS: REVENUE NEUTRALITY AND
INCENTIVES
To avoid these problems, a revenue-neutral tax can be
subject-friendly, allowing it to promote change without
necessarily utilizing the maritime sector as a revenue base.
While collecting taxes from this industry can be fiscally appealing
26. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, art. 191, § 2, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 132. The “Polluter-Pays”
principle is exemplified within the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, which developed a broad understanding of the parties responsible
for payment. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
de Janiero, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992).
27. See HER MAJESTY'S TREASURY, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE, 308 (2006) (explaining that, “[p]utting an appropriate price on carbon,
through taxes [. . .], means that people pay the full social cost of their actions”).
28. See generally William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of
Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1972).
29. See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAM, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2012 32
(2012), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf (emphasizing
the need for low-carbon alternatives).
30. See generally THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2.
31. Press Release, Moody’s, Moody’s: Negative Outlook for Global Shipping
Industry Due to Oversupply and High Oil Prices (May 31, 2012), available at
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Negative-outlook-for-global-shippingindustry-due-to-oversupply--PR_247207.
32. See LLOYD'S REGISTER, COP 15 AND THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY 1 (2010),
available at http://www.lr.org/Images/LRCOP15shippingbriefJan2010_tcm155175436.pdf.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/4
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for policy-makers to raise liquidity for government expenditure, a
perhaps more prudent solution in this instance is to design such a
tax without the intention of raising revenues.33 In this way, the
environmental objective can be met without direct government
expenditure. The objective is completed not by direct government
expenditure, but rather via maritime taxpayer investments in
low-emissions technology to reduce their overall emissions.34 The
EC’s proposed tax option in this instance is to have hypothecated
revenues,35 which means they may retain tax revenues for
expenditure on environmental projects.36 The proposal herein is
not to raise revenue for expenditure, but to utilize the revenues to
offset losses in other taxes—for which the maritime taxpayer is
seeking to have reduced—following their investment in
replacement technology.37
It may be possible to introduce allowable deductions for such
qualifying investments against, for example, corporation tax or
tonnage tax.38 While this may decrease a state’s overall tax
revenue from those charges, it can provide an additional incentive
for taxpayer compliance with the environmental objective. With
either method, the burden of the tax may be borne only by those
maritime transportation companies who do not make the
required shift to emissions abatement technology, and instead

33. See DAVID W. PEARCE, ET. AL., BLUEPRINT FOR A GREEN ECONOMY 164
(1989) (advocating the utilization of revenue-neutral taxation to avert climate
change, in order to keep the burden on taxpayers from increasing).
34. It is noted that low emissions technology is just one of several methods
for meeting an environmental objective.
35. ROADMAP, supra note 8, at 2.
36. See, e.g., Environmental Fund, DEP’T OF ENV’T, CMTY. & LOCAL GOV’T,
(2007), http://www.environ.ie/en/Environment/Waste/EnvironmentFund/ (last
visited Oct. 17, 2013) (describing how net revenues from Ireland’s plastic bag
levy were hypothecated to Irelands’ Environment Fund, set up pursuant to The
Waste Management (Amendment) Act 2001).
37. See APOLLONIA MIOLA ET AL., EUR. COMM’N, REGULATING AIR EMISSIONS
FROM SHIPS: THE STATE OF THE ART ON METHODOLOGIES, TECHNOLOGIES AND
POLICY OPTIONS 27 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/
jrc_reference_report_2010_11_ships_emissions.pdf.
38. See TTM01010 - Introduction to Tonnage Tax: A Brief Guide, HM
REVENUE
&
CUSTOMS,
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ttmmanual/
ttm01010.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (explaining that the United Kingdom’s
tonnage tax regime “is an alternative method of calculating corporation tax
profits by reference to the net tonnage of the ship operated”).
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suffer the charge in line with the polluter-pays principle.39
Revenues charged from such non-complying taxpayers may
recover some losses in government revenue endured by
deductions or allowances in corporation or tonnage tax.
If such budgetary allowances are not affordable in a given
situation, then instead, an emissions excise or fixed charge could
be introduced. This could be offset or reduced via investments in
low emissions or technology, so that the taxpayer has the option
to either pay the tax or invest in the technology. An elementary
comparison may be drawn with the United Kingdom’s Vehicle
Excise Duty, which enables motorists to select a low-emissions
vehicle with the option of a zero annual tax charge, or to select a
higher-emitting vehicle liable for a higher annual rate of tax.40
Additionally, by incentivizing investment in more efficient
maritime technology to reduce emissions, such measures may
instigate an advanced benefit of increasing investment in
research and development of new technologies.41
These
incentives for companies to minimize taxes can instigate the
development of new technologies, thus helping further the
environmental gains through possible methods of emissions
reductions.42 By encouraging emissions abatement measures,
this type of banding structure is preferable to the United

39. However depending on elasticity, the maritime transport company may
be able to pass on the cost to the end user, and therefore final incidence may not
be borne by those intended.
40. Vehicle Excise and Registration Act, 1994, c. 22, sch. 1 (Eng.).
41. See HM TREASURY, SUPPORTING GROWTH IN INNOVATION: ENHANCING THE
R&D TAX CREDIT 21 (2005) (U.K.), available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/
consult_new/rd-taxcredit.pdf.
42. For instance where there are bands of tax deductions similar in concept
to Vehicle Excise Duty, taxpayers may seek to avoid higher bands by purchasing
technologies suitable to lower bands. The U.K.’s Finance Act of 2001 introduced
the possibility of a zero annual charge, despite there being no vehicles on the
market at the time with suitably lower emissions to achieve such a charge.
Nevertheless such vehicles were subsequently introduced onto the market,
whilst other high emitting vehicle manufacturers produced lower emitting
vehicles to attract buyers wishing to mitigate their annual charge. See, e.g.,
Range Rover Evoque, LAND ROVER, http://www.landrover.com/us/en/lr/rangerover-evoque/explore/range-rover-evoque/ (follow “Engine” hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 17, 2013) (comparing the lower engine size of the Range Rover
Evoque with traditional Range Rover models).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/4
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Kingdom’s rudimentary Air Passenger Duty,43 which simply
charges per distance travelled rather than per emissions, thus
failing to incentivize a shift in technology.44
If such measures can be introduced in a manner not designed
to raise revenue but to encourage required changes, then it may
enable the intention of protecting commercial interests and
retaining competitiveness—by not adding to the overall costs of
maritime
transport
companies—while
achieving
the
environmental objective through incentivizing private sector
implementation of emissions abatement measures. There may
also be further benefits, including possible economic benefits of
promoting a state’s shipbuilding industry, plus environmental
and industry cost-saving benefits of reduced fuel costs. It is
estimated that $310 billion in fuel costs can be saved by 2030
with increased fuel-efficient technology resulting from IMO
measures.45 For policy-makers, the revenue-neutral approach
can have the attractive option of enabling expenditure-free46
achievement of environmental positivity.47
V. LIMITATIONS
Having established the basic premise for a revenue-neutral
tax to promote technological improvements to achieve maritime
emissions abatements, the possible limitations of introducing
such a proposed tax are considered and feasible means of
overcoming them are discussed.

43. Finance Act, 1994, c. 9, §§ 28-44, sch. 6 (Eng.), available at http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/9/pdfs/ukpga_19940009_en.pdf.
44. See Jon M. Truby, Reforming the Air Passenger Duty as an
Environmental Tax, 12 ENVTL. L. REV. 94, 102 (2010) (U.K.).
45. Report Shows Significant Reductions in Shipping’s CO2 Emissions from
IMO Measures, CARBON POSITIVE, http://www.carbonpositive.net/industryupdates/339-report-shows-significant-reductions-in-shippings-co2-emissionsfrom-imo-measures.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
46. Magnus S. Eide et al., Future Cost Scenarios for Reduction of Ship CO2
Emissions, 38 MAR. POL’Y & MGMT. 11, 11 (2011).
47. Francisco J. André et al., Performing an Environmental Tax Reform in a
Regional Economy. A Computable General Equilibrium Approach, 39 ANNALS
REG’L SCI. 375, 376 (2005) (noting “if a double dividend exists, it is possible to
improve the environmental quality without any cost in terms of nonenvironmental economic welfare”).
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A. Type of Tax and International Rules
It is important to distinguish the proposed emission tax48
from any sort of tax on marine fuel such as an excise tax, which
would not be permissible, at least for EU Member States.49 A
vessel emissions tax option raised in an EC report suggests
taxing “emissions weighted by sea region and distance from
shore.”50 This approach was found to be the best option in terms
of environmental and economic efficiencies, though difficulties in
administering and monitoring such emissions were noted.51 An
effective design may be in the form of an en-route emissions
charge on vessels,52 which would provide an incentive to reduce
the regular level of emissions for each trip, so as to reduce the
charge.
Such emissions tax measures however have not been fully
tested by the courts, and may face legal challenges pursuant to
the right to innocent passage of foreign vessels53 under the
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
agreement.54 Article 26 prohibits charges levied on foreign ships

48. Defined as “payments on direct releases into the environment, based on
pollutant characteristics and on the quantity of discharges.” MARKET-BASED
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS 4
(Mikael Andersen & Rolf-Ulrich Sprenger eds., 2000).
49. Directive 92/81/EEC of the European Council of 19 October 1992 on the
Harmonization of the Structures of Excise Duties on Mineral Oils, 1992 O.J. (L
316) 12, 14, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri
=OJ:L:1992:316:0012:0015:EN:PDF (prohibiting EU Member States from taxing
marine fuels). See also Directive 2003/96/EC of the European Council of 27
October 2003 on Restructuring of the Community Framework for the Taxation
of Energy Products and Electricity, 2003 O.J. (L 283) 51, 56, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:L:2003:283:0051:0070:en:pdf (prohibiting EU Member States from
introducing taxes on non-domestic shipping pursuant to Article 14).
50. DAVID HARRISON, JR. ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE FEASIBILITY OF
ALTERNATIVE MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS TO PROMOTE LOW-EMISSION SHIPPING
IN EUROPEAN UNION SEA AREAS 3 (2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/air/pdf/04_nera_report.pdf.
51. Id. at 7.
52. See id. at 11.
53. Id. (explaining Part 2, Section 3, of UNCLOS).
54. See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ convention_
agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
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“by reason only of their passage through the territorial sea,”55 but
permits non-discriminatory charges “as payment only for specific
services rendered to the ship.”56 Emissions charges are unlikely
to be classified as services. Equally, they may not be regarded as
charges purely for passage through a state’s waters since they are
for an environmental purpose rather than a charge for the right
of entry. Nevertheless, the ambiguity may prevent legislatures
from enacting a taxation measure that may result in expensive,
time-consuming, and potentially politically embarrassing legal
challenges that may be overturned.57
B. Leakage
A further legitimate reason for not implementing marine fuel
excise taxes is to mitigate the risk of leakage, whereby maritime
transporters switch fuelling purchases to retailers in non-taxing
jurisdictions.58 This example exerts caution to the present,
similar situation of implementing maritime emissions taxation
where it is important to avoid causing tax leakage, whereby
maritime transportation companies avoid such a tax by reregistering in non-charging or low rate jurisdictions and thus
providing less-environmentally proactive states with an economic
benefit of added business.59 Lloyd’s Register emphasizes the
simplicity by which vessels can re-flag to other states, mainly to
developing countries.60 Re-registration may allow the avoidance

55. Id. at art. 26(1).
56. Id. at art. 26(2).
57. Nigeria’s gross tonnage levy, pursuant to Marine Environment
Management (Sea Protection Levy) Regulation, treats foreign-flagged vessels
differently from Nigerian-flagged vessels, and poses a risk of being challenged
under UNCLOS Part II, Section 3, Article 26(2). See Shipping & Transport –
Nigeria: New Marine Environment (Sea Protection) Levy for Ships, INT’L L.
OFFICE (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/
detail.aspx?g=c0fc3aec-4f10-4d56-86dc-f025d12da09f.
58. See generally Piet Rietveld et al., Spatial Graduation of Fuel Taxes;
Consequences for Cross-Border and Domestic Fuelling, 35 TRANSP. RES. 433
(2001).
59. Jon M. Truby, Towards Overcoming the Conflict Between Environmental
Tax Leakage and Border Tax Adjustment Concessions for Developing Countries,
12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 164-65 (2010); see Directive 2009/29/EC supra note 7, at
8.
60. LLOYD'S REGISTER BRIEFING, supra note 32, at 1.
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of national shipping regulations, charges, or taxes.61 This risk is
highlighted by the EC, which emphasizes that “Member States at
individual level have been reluctant to develop legislation to
reduce emissions in this area as it may lead to reduced business
for their ports without a corresponding increase in environmental
integrity.”62 The significant danger of such leakage, to avoid any
maritime emissions taxation, reinforces the justification for a
revenue-neutral tax model that can be attractive for companies to
participate in, and the need for a multi-lateral effort to solve this
so that a state does not lose out economically through unilateral
measures.63
One potential means of overcoming competitiveness concerns
is to utilize border tax adjustments upon imports from states not
introducing similar environmental measures.
However, in
addition to the complexity of its administration and potential
harm to world trade,64 in the case of shipping, this—depending on
the bargaining strength of the state—may neither bring
worthwhile financial return nor encourage states enjoying the
benefits of increased port action to introduce similar
environmental measures.65
C. State Aid
Finally, the proposed revenue-neutral model, which
encourages investments in sustainable marine transportation
technology, may be deemed to favor a shipbuilding nation by
offering such goods or services, and be regarded as a form of state
61. See generally Ronald Becerra Rodríguez, Flags of Convenience Regulation
within the European Union and its Future on International Trade, 11 REVISTA
REPUBLICANA 15, 16 (2011).
62. ROADMAP supra note 8, at 2.
63. See Anna Mellin & Hanna Rydhed, Swedish Ports’ Attitudes Towards
Regulations of the Shipping Sector's Emissions of CO2, 38 MAR. POL’Y & MGMT.
437, 441 (2011) (Swed.).
64. See Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of A Carbon Tax, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 551 (2009).
65. PER KÅGESON ET AL., MARKET BASED INSTRUMENTS FOR ABATEMENT OF
EMISSIONS FROM SHIPPING: A PILOT PROJECT FOR THE BALTIC SEA 81 (Katharina
Koppe & Falk Heinen eds., 2008), available at http://www.isl.org/sites/default/
files/projects/mbi/3852.pdf (noting that in the similar situation of port charges,
“the fairway dues are in most cases not large enough to allow for an
environmental differentiation that reflects the difference in emissions among
ships”).
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aid. EU rules66 on state aid do allow some incentives for
environmentally efficient ship models, but the risk of a legal
challenge remains.67
VI. EU ETS
While the scope of the EU market means that a Union-wide
measure could have a considerable impact within the Union and
be influential outside of it, the EU is actually limited in its
options to introduce a measure that can have the desired impact
and be legitimate.68 Despite the feasible impact of a possible
maritime emissions tax as discussed, the sovereignty of each
Member State over its own tax affairs prevents the EU from
introducing EU-wide taxes.69 Thus, the EU ETS has been a
carefully contemplated market-based measure, designed in part
to avoid the illegitimacy of being an EU imposed tax, and has
successfully defeated legal challenges to prove that it is not an
illegal charge under international law.70 Though the comparative
efficiencies are not considered herein, its ability to incentivize
change in a similar manner as a revenue-neutral tax discussed
are not doubted.71

66. See generally Commission Communication C(2004) 43 Community
Guidelines on State Aid to Maritime Transport, 2004 O.J. (C 13) 3, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:C:2004:013:0003:0012:en:pdf.
67. See Iliana Christodoulou-Varotsi, A Maritime Competition Reading of
Regulation 1408/71/EC on the Co-ordination of Social Security Systems in the
European Union: Is the Current Regime Out-of-Date?, in COMPETITION AND
REGULATION IN SHIPPING AND SHIPPING RELATED INDUSTRIES 207, 219-20
(Antōnios M. Antapasis, Lia I. Athanassiou, & Erik Røsæg eds., 2009); MARK
CLOUGH & FERGUS RANDOLPH, SHIPPING AND EC COMPETITION LAW 284-85 (1991).
68. See generally Henrik Ringbom, Global Problem—Regional Solution?
International Law Reflections on an EU CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme for
Ships, 26 INT’L J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 613 (2011) (explaining ETS and
discussing options).
69. See MATHIEU ISENBAERT, EC LAW AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE MEMBER
STATES IN DIRECT TAXATION 452 (2010).
70. See Jon Truby, Extraterritoriality or an Illegal Tax? A Challenge to the
Inclusion of Aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 14 ENVTL. L. REV.
301, 305 (2012) (U.K.).
71. Markus Lederer, Market Making Via Regulation: The Role of the State in
Carbon Markets, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 524, 529 (2012); see generally Mustafa
Babiker et al., Is International Emissions Trading Always Beneficial?, 25
ENERGY J. 33 (2004).
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The attraction of a maritime emissions tax fades against this
option, since it faces risks of legal challenges, leakage, and
competitive disadvantages. Further, since only individual states
are empowered to enact tax measures, it lacks the same
influential impact for environmental improvement as a tax made
by the EU at Union level. The EU ETS’ ability to initiate this
environmental change in the entire EU would be a game-changer,
for the maritime emissions of EU registered ships as well as any
such ships utilizing EU waters.72
VII. CONCLUSION
Consequently, the inclusion of maritime transportation
emissions in the EU ETS remains a more attractive option as
opposed to a maritime emissions tax.73 With reduced complexity
and fewer potential legal challenges, the framework for the EU
ETS already exists, and the transition to include maritime
emissions would thus be relatively straightforward and can be
enacted centrally rather than locally. The EU has already
experimented with this preferred option with air transport,
having legally defeated the same extraterritoriality arguments
from non-EU states that the inclusion of maritime emissions in
the EU ETS would face.74 Though it faced external political

72. Despite winning a lengthy legal battle to prove that the inclusion of
aviation in the EU ETS was not contrary to international law, the EU has
proposed the temporary suspension of the inclusion of non-EU aircraft into the
EU ETS, pending an international agreement on the matter by the
International Civil Aviation Organisation. Proposal for a Decision of the
European Parliament and of the Council Derogating Temporarily from Directive
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community,
at 3, COM (2012), 697 final (Nov. 20, 2011).
73. There also remains the unexplored option of utilising border tax
adjustments as mentioned above to support tax measures, to support any
reduction of competitiveness caused by the EU ETS. See generally Ronald Ismer
& Karsten Neuhoff, Border Tax Adjustment: A Feasible Way to Support
Stringent Emission Trading, 24 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 137 (2007); Javier de Cendra,
Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An
Analysis vis-à-vis WTO Law, 15 REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 131 (2006).
74. See Jon Truby, Extraterritoriality or an Illegal Tax? A Challenge to the
Inclusion of Aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 14 ENVTL. L. REV.
301, 305 (2012) (U.K.).
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pressure to end the scheme,75 the inclusion of both EU and nonEU airlines in the EU ETS, provided sufficient global pressure to
ensure that the International Civil Aviation Organization
eventually agreed to implement—by 2020—a new global marketbased mechanism to aviation emissions—a major success for the
EU following decades of inaction by the organization.76 Thus the
global political implications of including maritime emissions in
the EU ETS could be far wider reaching than just the EU,
potentially ensuring the issue is taken seriously at a global scale.

75. Barbara Lewis & Valerie Volcovici, Insight: U.S., China Turned EU
Powers Against Airline Pollution Law, REUTERS, (Dec. 10, 2012, 7:08 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/10/us-eu-airlines-climateidUSBRE8B801H20121210.
76. Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Assembly—Thirty-Eighth Session Report
of the Executive Committee on Agenda Item 17 (Section on Climate Change) at
17-6, ICAO Doc. A38-WP/430 (Mar. 10, 2013), available at http://www.icao.int/
Meetings/a38/Documents/WP/wp430_en.pdf; see Reducing Emissions from
Aviation: Inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS, EUR. COMM’N, (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/.
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